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Dominant Digital Platforms: Is Antitrust Up to the 
Task? 
Steven C. Salop 
abstract.  It has been one hundred years since the end of the Progressive Era and twenty 
years since the Microsoft settlement. This twenty-year period has seen the rise of the Internet and 
a new set of dominant platforms, as well as increased consolidation in the brick-and-mortar world. 
Antitrust has become more permissive. This Essay examines both issues: (i) the potential legal 
difficulties in reining in exclusionary conduct by dominant platforms; and (ii) merger under-en-
forcement.  This Essay argues that it is necessary to strengthen antitrust enforcement. Consolida-
tion through mergers and exclusionary conduct by dominant firms can harm consumers and work-
ers and reduce innovation. Digital networks are a particular concern because barriers to entry, 
which result from substantial network effects and economies of scale and scope, rise as platforms’ 
dominance is enhanced. While antitrust law in principle can evolve, new legislation would be a 
more rapid—and more certain—path to reform. 
introduction 
There has been growing public concern over both market concentration gen-
erally and the monopoly power of digital platforms and their effects on U.S. 
competition and consumer and worker welfare.1 These concerns are reinforced 
by the worsening skew in the distribution of income and wealth.2 Concentration 
 
1. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUI-
TABLE GROWTH (Mar. 20, 2017), https://equitablegrowth.org/market-power-in-the-u-s 
-economy-today [https://perma.cc/8D2C-DX74]; Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, 
Confronting Rising Market Power, ECON. FOR INCLUSIVE PROSPERITY (May 2019), https:// 
econfip.org/policy-brief/confronting-rising-market-power [https://perma.cc/9XS4-2TXK]. 
2. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1 (2015); Sean F. Ennis, Pedro Gonzaga & Chris Pike, Inequality: A Hidden 
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has visibly increased in airlines, beer, agricultural products, and health care, 
among other sectors, and the dominance of Google, Facebook, Apple, and Am-
azon has attracted increased attention. 
Competitive concerns about digital networks are not new. Payment-card net-
works—primarily Visa, American Express (AmEx), and MasterCard—have been 
subject to substantial antitrust attacks.3  Dominant travel-booking platforms like 
Sabre charge significant fees for airline tickets.4 Control over digital home list-
ings by realtor associations has been used to support high real-estate sales com-
missions by discouraging discount brokers.5  
The growing role of the internet in information dissemination, advertising, 
social discourse, and commerce raises fears that a small number of firms (most 
notably, Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Apple) will have control over commu-
nication and retail commerce. This control can have political and social effects, 
as well as more purely economic effects.6 Google controls search advertising and 
also has gained power in the sale of display and contextual ads.7 It also controls 
the Android operating system and charges fees for applications that are used by 
Android device users. Apple has similar power over the applications for iPhones 
and iPads.8 Facebook’s dominance of social media gives it control over narrowly 
 
Cost of Market Power, 35 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 518 (2019); Joshua Gans, Andrew Leigh, 
Martin Schmalz & Adam Triggs, Inequality and Market Concentration, When Shareholding Is 
More Skewed than Consumption, 35 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 550 (2019). 
3. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 
F.3d 229 (2003); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff 'd, 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005) (approving settlement to a class action 
alleging Visa and MasterCard illegally tied their debit products to their credit cards in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act); In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 
No. 05-MD-1720 (MKB) (JO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217583 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2019) (ap-
proving settlement to a class action alleging that Visa, Mastercard, and various issuing and 
acquiring banks harmed competition and charged the merchants supracompetitive fees by 
creating unlawful contracts and rules and by engaging in various antitrust conspiracies).  
4. United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97, 104 (D. Del. 2020). 
5. Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 829-32 (6th Cir. 2011).  
6. For a sample of the antitrust issues raised by these concerns, see Stigler Comm. on Dig. Plat-
forms, Final Report, STIGLER CTR. (Sept. 2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media 
/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-report---stigler-center.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/KH7Z-CWNN]. 
7. MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL & ADMIN. LAW, H. COMMITTEE 
ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 129-
31, 206-07 (2020) [hereinafter COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS REPORT], https://judiciary 
.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf, [https://perma.cc/GBQ7 
-LTBV].  
8. Id. at 334-35.  
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targeted advertising, including targeted political messaging.9 Amazon controls a 
substantial share of online retail commerce and charges large fees to sellers who 
sell through its Marketplace.10 Not only do these platforms have substantial mar-
ket power, but their conduct also has raised a variety of antitrust concerns. This 
involves both exclusionary conduct directed at competitors and acquisitions that 
can enhance or entrench the platforms’ dominance by gaining control over in-
novative competitors or complementary products that could become competi-
tors or facilitate competition by others. 
These concerns harken back to the Gilded Age and the trusts that led to the 
Sherman Act in 1890. Indeed, some critics refer to themselves as New Brande-
isians or New Progressives.11 The trusts combined competing firms into inte-
grated enterprises that wielded monopoly power to collusively raise prices and 
exclude competition. The Sherman Act achieved some substantial market re-
structuring in response, including the breakup of Standard Oil12 and the North-
ern Securities railroad trust,13 until the failure of the U.S. Steel case in 1920.14 
Since that time, the two most notable attacks on monopoly power have been the 
1982 antitrust consent decree that broke up the AT&T monopoly, and the 1998 
Microsoft case and 2001 settlement that contributed to the successful entry of 
Google and other internet services.15 
 
9. Id. at 170-71.  
10. Id. at 149, 151. 
11. See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018); Lina 
Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. 
& PRAC. 131 (2018). 
12. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
13. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
14. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). It is noteworthy that the case was de-
cided on a 4-3 vote, and the two recused Justices (Brandeis and McReynolds) likely would 
have supported liability. Justice McReynolds had been involved in the investigation of U.S. 
Steel when he was the Attorney General. Justice Brandeis had written negative articles about 
U.S. Steel before joining the Court. See Thomas K. McCraw & Forest Reinhardt, Losing to 
Win: U.S. Steel’s Pricing, Investment Decisions, and Market Share, 1901-1938, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 
593, 613 (1989). 
15. Absent the case, Microsoft could have disadvantaged Google’s search engine, just as it did 
with respect to Netscape and Java. As stated by Gary Reback, who was Netscape’s outside 
counsel and helped launch the case, “Microsoft could have killed Google in the cradle. Its fear 
of additional antitrust investigation influenced its decision not to crush Google, and paved 
the way for Web 2.0 and a huge wave of new companies.” John Swartz, Big Tech Was Built by 
the Same Type of Antitrust Actions that Could Now Tear It Down, MARKETWATCH (June 16, 2019 
11:52 PM ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/big-tech-was-built-by-the-same-type 
-of-antitrust-actions-that-could-now-tear-it-down-2019-06-12 [https://perma.cc/VD3D 
-RMCQ]. 
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It has now been one hundred years since the end of the Progressive Era and 
twenty years since the Microsoft settlement. Microsoft’s exclusionary conduct 
towards Netscape arose from Bill Gates’s fears that the “Internet Tidal Wave” 
might weaken Microsoft’s power. This twenty-year period has seen the rise of 
the Internet and a new set of dominant platforms, as well as increased consoli-
dation in the brick-and-mortar world. 
Antitrust has become more permissive, which raises the question of whether 
antitrust laws governing mergers and exclusionary conduct should be strength-
ened. This Essay will examine both issues: (1) the potential legal difficulties in 
reining in exclusionary conduct by dominant platforms; and (2) merger under-
enforcement, which has permitted this market consolidation and similarly may 
permit future vertical mergers and acquisitions of new entrants by dominant 
platforms and other leading firms. 
In my view, it is necessary to strengthen antitrust enforcement in these areas. 
Consolidation through mergers and exclusionary conduct by dominant firms 
can harm consumers and workers and reduce innovation. Digital networks are a 
particular concern because barriers to entry, which result from substantial net-
work effects and economies of scale and scope, rise as platforms’ dominance is 
enhanced. While antitrust law in principle can evolve, new legislation would be 
a more rapid—and more certain—path to reform. 
The remainder of this Essay is organized as follows. Part I focuses on exclu-
sionary conduct by dominant firms, including dominant digital platforms. Part 
II focuses on vertical mergers and acquisition of potential or nascent competi-
tors. Part III then discusses the need to strengthen antitrust law and enforce-
ment, both generally and specifically with respect to dominant digital platforms. 
i .  exclusionary conduct by dominant firms 
It is important to recognize an inherent limitation of section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. Section 2 is not a “no fault” statute. It does not prohibit lawful monopolies 
from charging monopoly prices. It prohibits “monopolization,” which is exclu-
sionary conduct that permits a firm to achieve, enhance, or maintain monopoly 
power and thereby has anticompetitive effects on consumers.16 These anticompet-
itive effects include higher prices, but also lower quality products and reduced 
innovation. For example, Microsoft was found to have engaged in variety of ex-
clusionary conduct (i.e., exclusive contracts; integration of Internet Explorer 
 
16. In this Essay, I will focus on anticompetitive conduct that harms purchasers. However, the 
antitrust laws also condemn buyer-side anticompetitive conduct that harms workers or other 
input suppliers. For example, the agreement among National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) members not to compensate college athletes was found to violate the Sherman Act. 
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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into Windows; deception and threats) designed to prevent competition in oper-
ating systems that would have been facilitated by the success of Netscape and 
Java.17 The focus of the Microsoft case was innovation competition, not price 
competition. 
A. Hurdles to Successful Section 2 Litigation 
Some allegedly anticompetitive conduct by the platforms involves agree-
ments with platform transactors, which can be attacked under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Likewise, unilateral conduct can be attacked under section 2, 
where potential remedies can be stronger. This Essay will focus on section 2 en-
forcement, though many of the issues also will apply to section 1 litigation. 
Effective section 2 enforcement faces three important hurdles. First, section 
2 only applies to firms with monopoly power or a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power. Second, even if the exclusionary conduct harms 
competitors, consumers may not be harmed because of offsetting price or quality 
benefits from the conduct. Third, antitrust liability does not automatically lead 
to the break-up of the monopoly. A court instead may enjoin the anticompetitive 
conduct. I will now discuss how these hurdles apply to the tech platforms. 
Monopoly Power. While the tech platforms are large, evidence is needed 
to establish monopoly power. In litigation, the platforms no doubt would 
argue that competition is “just a click away.” However, the real issue is 
whether such substitution by users is a sufficient constraint on anticom-
petitive conduct or monopoly pricing by these platforms—a proposition 
that seems unlikely in light of their market shares in their core areas and 
the substantial barriers to entry and expansion facing new entrants and 
smaller competitors. In addition, if there is “direct evidence” of anticom-
petitive effects, that evidence also is convincing proof of market power, 
as discussed below. 
 
Anticompetitive Effects. In litigation, the platforms likely would claim that 
they have achieved their power “on the merits” by providing innovative 
products. However, this showing should not be sufficient if the case al-
leges anticompetitive maintenance of monopoly, rather than achievement 
of monopoly power. The monopoly maintenance claim would focus on 
whether the alleged exclusionary conduct raises barriers to entry or com-
petition by smaller or nascent competitors. For example, this was the 
 
17. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46-48 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This is sometimes re-
ferred to as a “monopoly broth.” See City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 
986 (7th Cir. 1980).  
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structure of the Microsoft case.18 Companies may argue that it must be 
proved that the excluded competitor would have succeeded in weakening 
the monopoly. However, in Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit rejected Mi-
crosoft’s claim that strong causation evidence must be shown. As the 
court explained, “[t]o require that § 2 liability turn on a plaintiff ’s ability 
or inability to reconstruct the hypothetical marketplace absent a defend-
ant’s anticompetitive conduct would only encourage monopolists to take 
more and earlier anticompetitive action.”19 This is because “neither 
plaintiffs nor the court can confidently reconstruct a product’s hypothet-
ical technological development in a world absent the defendant’s exclu-
sionary conduct.”20 After American Express,21 the plaintiff will need to ac-
count for that fact that these platforms compete in “two-sided” markets, 
which makes the analysis more complex. While the effects on both sides 
of the market can be competently analyzed, they may confuse courts.  
 
Remedy. Obtaining an effective remedy can be a challenge if the govern-
ment agency or court wishes to minimize intrusion. Standard Oil was 
successfully broken up into multiple entities. But when the government 
sought to break Microsoft up into separate operating systems and appli-
cations companies, the D.C. Circuit signaled that this remedy would be 
unwarranted.22 However, conduct remedies face the twin problems of 
loopholes and market evolution that can affect the firm’s choice of exclu-
sionary instrument, which makes conduct remedies hard for a generalist 
court to design and enforce. It is difficult for a consent decrees to antici-
pate all the ways in which the firm might respond in a dynamic industry.  
For example, the Microsoft consent decree did not anticipate the potential 
to exclude competing search engines.  This is one of the rationales for 
 
18. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50-51.  
19. Id. at 79. 
20. Id. 
21. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
22. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 80 (“Microsoft’s concerns over causation have more purchase in connec-
tion with the appropriate remedy . . . divestiture is a remedy that is imposed only with great 
caution, in part because its long-term efficacy is rarely certain. Absent some measure of con-
fidence that there has been an actual loss to competition that needs to be restored, wisdom 
counsels against adopting radical structural relief.”); see also Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 
373 F.3d 1199, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding the district court’s approval of the consent 
decree that Microsoft entered into with the United States and certain plaintiff states). 
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sectoral regulation, rather than simply relying on antitrust, though reg-
ulation also can face similar problems.23 
Finally, section 2 doctrine has become much more defendant-friendly over 
time. The expansive approach of Alcoa24 is ancient history. Skeptical conservative 
commentators successfully advocated for higher procedural and substantive bur-
dens on plaintiffs, even for defendants with substantial market power.25 They 
argued that exclusionary conduct allegations relied on defective economic rea-
soning: that monopolists are important innovators and that monopolized mar-
kets would rapidly self-correct. However, post-Chicagoans make the point that 
whatever relevance these assumptions had for 1950s and 1960s antitrust, they 
clearly are no longer justified.26 A rigorous economic basis for the competitive 
harms from exclusionary conduct claims has been established. Theoretical and 
empirical evidence has shown that innovation incentives are stronger when a 
dominant firm faces competition.27 And it is now clear that the market self-cor-
rection claim ignores the fact that the exclusionary conduct itself raises artificial 
barriers to entry.28 
Conservative commentators also overlooked the fact that defendants’ much 
larger financial stakes give them incentives to spend much more to defend their 
interests than rivals, who are attempting to enter and create a competitive mar-
ket, and so have much lower financial stakes and resulting incentives to invest in 
private litigation. These financial asymmetries tend to skew outcomes in favor 
 
23. Jean Tirole, Competition and the Industrial Challenge for the Digital Age, IFS DEATON REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5-12), https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE 
/documents/doc/by/tirole/competition_and_the_industrial_challenge_april_3_2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WU3M-LAUG] 
24. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
25. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 134-60 (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1984). 
26. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error out of ‘Error Cost’ Analysis: What’s Wrong with 
Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1-2 (2015); Andrew I. Gavil & Steven C. Salop, Proba-
bility, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing the Rule of Reason 
for Exclusionary Conduct, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
27. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in THE RATE 
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 361 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stem eds., 2012); 
Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 575, 579-86 (2007); Baker supra note 26, at 14,. 
28. Baker supra note 26, at 10. The most notable case of an innovator maintaining its monopoly 
through erecting barriers to entry is Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d, where Microsoft, a monopolist 
in the operating system market, was found guilty of monopolization because it erected barri-
ers to Netscape’s and other “middleware” providers’ entry into the operating systems market. 
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of the defendant relative to the underlying merits and thus increase the likeli-
hood of false negatives (i.e., underdeterrence and erroneous convictions).29 Pub-
lic enforcers similarly are disadvantaged because they face severe budget con-
straints. 
The digital platforms compete in two-sided markets, which can complicate 
the analysis. This was the case in the recent American Express case.30 While this 
case involved exclusionary vertical agreements by a platform with market power 
(not monopoly power) and was alleged to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act 
(not section 2), it is useful for illustrating the hurdles facing plaintiffs in section 
2 litigation involving two-sided digital platforms. 
B. Two-Sided Markets 
Two-sided digital platforms provide services for multiple users that interact 
through the platform and comprise an interdependent network ecosystem.31 For 
example, Google offers search services to users and advertising opportunities to 
companies who want to reach the searchers. Google and Apple provide operating 
systems and application stores that permit developers to sell applications to us-
ers.32 Facebook and Twitter provide platforms for users to communicate with 
each other and for advertisers to deliver targeted advertisements to users. Ama-
zon and eBay provide retail marketplaces that connect vendors and consumers. 
All of these companies also sell data on user characteristics and behavior. Visa 
and American Express connect banks, merchants and card holders.33 Sabre and 
Expedia link airlines, travelers and travel agents to make travel bookings.34 
These platforms benefit from network effects, whereby an increase in the 
number of users will increase the attractiveness of the network to the firms on 
the other side of the platform as well as to other users. In search, for example, 
more searches generate more user data, which can permit more narrowly tar-
 
29. Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in Antitrust Litigation (2020) (un-
published manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3563843 [https://perma.cc/4SLN-34BB]. 
30. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
31. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 35 RAND J. ECON. 
645, 645 (2006).  
32. For examples of two-sided digital platforms, including Google and Facebook, see Jørgen Veis-
dal, The Dynamics of Entry for Digital Platforms in Two-sided Markets: A Multi-Case Study, 30 
ELECTRONIC MARKETS 539 (2020). 
33. See Evans & Schmalensee, Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 1 COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 
667, 672 (2008).   
34. See United States v. Sabre Corp., No. 19-1548-LPS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64637 (D. Del. Apr. 
7, 2020). 
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geted advertising and better recommendations. Network effects also can en-
trench the power of a dominant provider. Network effects are not a unique fea-
ture of digital platforms. Farmers’ markets and shopping malls create network 
effects in that a more desirable set of vendors or stores attract more shoppers and 
vice versa.35 What makes these digital transaction platforms more worrisome is 
their geographic and commercial breadth, which exacerbates their influence over 
commerce and creates higher barriers to entry and expansion for entrants and 
smaller competitors. 
Platforms account for the network effects and interdependencies between 
users on both sides of the market in setting prices and offering services. For ex-
ample, Google does not charge users for searches, but instead earns revenue from 
advertising and data.36 The greater the number of searches, the greater the ad-
vertising and data revenues earned by Google. Other platforms act similarly. 
Credit card networks charge high fees to merchants and offer “rewards” to high 
volume card users.37 
Two-sided competition complicates antitrust analysis because it requires 
analysis of the competitive interdependence and impact on customers in both 
affected markets. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investi-
gated allegations that Google engaged in exclusionary conduct against rival 
shopping services by manipulating search results, harming its shopping service 
rivals, and permitting Google to charge higher prices to the merchants to which 
it directed traffic.38 However, the FTC did not bring a case, concluding that 
Google’s conduct may have benefited consumers on the other side of the market 
by increasing the quality of consumer searches so that consumer welfare was not 
necessarily harmed on balance.39 
The platforms track users and sell data to advertisers that arguably reduce 
users’ privacy. But Google and others might argue that most users value the tar-
geted ads and users place a higher value on free search (or lower prices in the 
case of other networks) than any loss in privacy. All these firms also might argue 
that any loss in privacy does not raise barriers to entry because a new entrant 
could promise not to share consumer information. However, this argument ig-
nores the other substantial entry barriers. For example, while the DuckDuckGo 
 
35. See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF 
MULTISIDED PLATFORMS 18 (2016). 
36. See Evans & Schmalensee supra note 33 at 671. 
37. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2281; Evans & Schmalensee supra note 33at 672. 
38. FED. TRADE COMM’N, F.T.C. NO. 111-0163, STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
REGARDING GOOGLE’S SEARCH PRACTICES, IN RE GOOGLE INC. (Jan. 3, 2013). 
39. By contrast, the European Commission found Google liable for this same search engine con-
duct, enjoining the conduct and fining Google €2.42 billion. Google Search (Shopping) 
(40411) Commission Decision 2018/C 9/08 [2017] OJ C 9/11, 9/14. 
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search engine offers more privacy protections than Google, its share is very 
small.40 Google might argue that privacy has low value, whereas Google’s oppo-
nents might argue that other engines’ low share is the result of insufficient search 
data. 
These platforms also operate in multiple market spaces. Google also runs 
real-time auctions in which advertisers bid for ad space on the websites of vari-
ous publishers. Critics allege that Google has used exclusionary conduct in sup-
plying advertising technology services to both publishers and advertisers.41 
Google might argue in rebuttal that its conduct is efficient competition on the 
merits. 
Critics have alleged that Amazon excludes competition by preventing ven-
dors from charging lower prices on other retail shopping platforms.42 If this case 
were litigated, Amazon likely would argue that it lacks monopoly power in a rel-
evant retail market that includes brick-and-mortar stores, whereas opponents 
would allege an e-commerce market. Amazon also might argue that its conduct 
prevents free riding on Amazon’s website, whereas opponents would allege that 
Amazon prevents merchants from charging lower prices on other platforms or 
their own websites, thereby raising entry barriers. For example, a new market-
place entrant might want to charge lower commissions to vendors, allowing 
them to offer lower prices on the marketplace as a way to attract more customers 
to the marketplace. If the vendors cannot offer lower prices than Amazon, the 
marketplace is less likely to attract traffic, which will make entry less likely. Fi-
nally, Amazon also might claim that its tracking behavior improves the shopping 
experience of its users by offering them valuable recommendations, recommen-
dations that they are not forced to accept. However, opponents might counter 
that Amazon can reduce competition by deceptively skewing recommendations 
to disadvantage retail competitors. 
It is appropriate for antitrust to account for the effects on both sides of a two-
sided market. One question is which party should bear the evidentiary burden. 
 
40. Sarah Berry, 2020 Search Market Share: 5 Hard Truths About Today’s Market, WEBFX (Jan. 1, 
2020), https://www.webfx.com/blog/seo/2019-search-market-share [https://perma.cc 
/6ARE-KBD7]. 
41. Fiona M. Scott Morton & David C. Dinielli, Roadmap for a Digital Advertising Monopolization 
Case Against Google, OMIDYAR NETWORK (May 2020), https://www.omidyar.com/sites/de-
fault/files/Roadmap%20for%20a%20Case%20Against%20Google.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/PJ2V-AHQA]. For the analogous analysis of Facebook, see, for example, Fiona Scott Morton 
& David C. Dinielli, Roadmap for an Antitrust Case Against Facebook, OMIDYAR NETWORK (June 
2020), https://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/Roadmap%20for%20an%20Antitrust 
%20Case%20Against%20Facebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DT3-5BHY]. 
42. Spencer Soper, Amazon Squeezes Sellers that Offer Better Prices on Walmart, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 
5, 2019, 12:28 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-05/amazon-is 
-squeezing-sellers-that-offer-better-prices-on-walmart [https://perma.cc/98DB-UJ53].  
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Should it be sufficient for the plaintiff to produce evidence of harm on one side 
to shift the burden to the defendant to produce sufficient evidence of offsetting 
benefits to then shift the burden back to the plaintiff; or should the defendant 
have the burden of proof that benefits exceed costs? The other question is the 
appropriate height of the burdens. In my view, the inquiry should place relatively 
more weight on avoiding false negatives (i.e., erroneous acquittals and under-
deterrence) than false positives (i.e., erroneous convictions and over-deter-
rence). The competitive concerns are substantial and the high barriers to entry 
and expansion can allow the conduct to entrench the platforms’ monopoly 
power for a significant period of time. This increases the cost of false negatives 
relative to false positives.43 In addition, many of the claimed benefits of the chal-
lenged conduct likely can be achieved by less exclusionary alternatives—a fact 
that reduces the cost of false negatives. As a result, accepting a small reduction 
in those benefits generally can lead to much larger benefits from more vigorous 
competition. The legal standards also should take account for the fact that sec-
tion 2 litigation outcomes likely are distorted by the fact that the defendants have 
the incentive to greatly outspend private plaintiffs and that public-agency budg-
ets are limited. 
C. Ohio v. American Express 
The potential complexities from accounting for the effects on both sides of a 
two-sided market can be illustrated by the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Ohio v. American Express.44 The Department of Justice (DOJ) and several States 
filed suit against American Express, Visa, and MasterCard in 2010 for “anti-
steering” provisions contained in each of their contracts with merchants.45 These 
provisions prohibit merchants from responding to high fees charged by a card 
brand by attempting to steer customers to use another card brand, either with 
surcharges, discounts, signs or verbal requests. Visa and MasterCard agreed to 
delete the provisions, but Amex litigated. While the plaintiffs prevailed at trial, 
the Second Circuit reversed.46 The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit 
in a 5-4 decision by Justice Thomas.47 
 
43. See Baker supra note 28 at 8-12, 37. 
44. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). Card networks are two-sided, competing on 
one side for card holders and for merchant acceptance on the other side. The two sides are 
linked by network effects in that a card brand is more desirable to merchants if it is used by 
more consumers, and it is more desirable to consumers if it is accepted by more merchants. 
45. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 216-17 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
46. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 207 (2d Cir. 2016). 
47. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2290 (holding that “plaintiffs . . . have not carried their burden 
of proving that Amex’s antisteering provisions have anticompetitive effects.”). 
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Justice Breyer’s dissent explained why the anti-steering provisions are anti-
competitive.48 If steering is prevented, a merchant’s only recourse to a higher 
network fee is to cease accepting the card altogether. Because each of these net-
works accounts for a significant fraction of transactions, and many consumers 
would not simply use another card, that response would be very costly to the 
merchant, which substantially reduces its countervailing power.49 As a result, the 
networks’ constraints on fee increases are reduced, which leads to higher fees by 
all of them. Faced with higher costs of card acceptance, merchants are led to raise 
their retail prices, which harms both card users and also the generally lower in-
come customers who pay with cash. The card networks spend some of their 
higher fees on rewarding card usage, particularly by higher income users. Thus, 
some card holders may gain from higher merchant fees, despite higher merchan-
dise prices. Still, most do not and, of course, cash customers clearly are harmed.50 
These rules also create a dysfunctional market dynamic. All customers pay 
the higher merchandise prices, which creates an incentive to use cards rather 
than cash, even if the reward is very small. This leads to a vicious cycle in which 
there is more card usage, which in turn further raises merchants’ costs and retail 
prices, which further encourages more card usage, and so on. Indeed, card usage 
likely exceeds the competition level. 
Despite this logic and supporting evidence of actual fee increases, the Su-
preme Court reversed. It characterized the Amex fee increase as competition on 
the merits because it could support larger user rewards. In doing so, the Court 
ignored the impact on cash customers and the users of other cards. It also seemed 
to ignore the fact that the other networks similarly would have incentives to raise 
their merchant fees in response. The Court erroneously relied on the increasing 
volume of card transactions over time as evidence of procompetitive output in-
creases, ignoring the fact that card usage rises as the economy grows and ignor-
ing the dysfunctional market dynamic. 
Importantly, the Court also found that the plaintiffs did not show that Amex 
had market power in the relevant two-sided transaction platform market. The 
plaintiffs had defined the relevant market as services to merchants and concluded 
 
48. Id. at 2293-94. 
49. While many customers carry multiple cards, some do not. Even if a consumer has multiple 
cards, some cards may be maxed out on the user’s credit line. Some customers are required to 
use an Amex corporate card for business purchases or travel expenses. Finally, the stores may 
lose some sales from consumers who would prefer to go elsewhere rather than lose the “re-
wards” from using their Amex card. 
50. The District Court found that the anti-steering rule led to the merchants paying higher fees 
and that the rewards were small relative to the higher fees paid by merchants. Am. Express Co., 
88 F. Supp. 3d at 208, 216-17. 
dominant digital platforms 
575 
that Amex had market power in this market. They also traced through the po-
tential effects on rewards on the other side as a procompetitive efficiency benefit, 
but found that the rewards did not adequately compensate for the likely higher 
merchandise prices. 
The plaintiffs had evidence that merchant fees were raised as a result of 
Amex’s conduct and the rewards were insufficient to offset the harms from the 
higher fees. As Justice Breyer correctly explained, “proof of actual adverse effects 
on competition is, a fortiori, proof of market power. Without such power, the 
restraints could not have brought about the anticompetitive effects that the 
plaintiff proved.”51 But, the Court was unwilling to rely on this direct evidence of 
anticompetitive price effects to infer Amex’s market power.52 Moreover, the 
Court’s rejection of direct evidence was in contrast to the modern trend in anti-
trust law adopted for horizontal restraints in NCAA53 and Indiana Federation of 
Dentists.54 Similarly, in Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit relied on direct proof of mo-
nopoly power as well as circumstantial evidence.55 
However, the Court here took the position that direct evidence was insuffi-
cient for vertical agreements such as Amex’s merchant agreement. Instead, it was 
necessary to prove market power with circumstantial evidence, even before reach-
ing the issue of the likelihood of anticompetitive effects.56 This is an inferior ap-
proach. Using circumstantial evidence to support a two-sided platform market 
and market power is complicated because the parties on the two sides are very 
different, as are the prices charged to each of them. Antitrust markets are nor-
mally defined to include reasonable substitutes. But the parties on the two sides 
 
51. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2297. 
52. Id. at 2296-97. 
53. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110-12 (1984) 
(arguing that the NCAA possessed market power because the anticompetitive restraints on 
price and output had adverse effects on the television broadcasting market given that there 
were no “reasonably substitutable” products besides the one provided by the NCAA). 
54. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (using direct proof to show market 
power in Sherman Act section 1 action for unreasonable restraint of trade). 
55. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 56-58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
56. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285-87. The Court’s stated rationale for this “fifth-wheel” re-
quirement was that vertical contracts are presumptively procompetitive. However, while this 
presumption has often been proposed by Chicago-School commentators, it was not adopted 
in the Court’s recent Leegin decision, which merely mandated the rule of reason. Leegin Cre-
ative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (“Respected economic ana-
lysts, furthermore, conclude that vertical price restraints can have procompetitive effects. We 
now hold that Dr. Miles should be overruled and that vertical price restraints are to be judged 
by the rule of reason.”) (emphasis added). 
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of a platform purchase complementary products from the platform, not substi-
tutes. Moreover, the requirement adds nothing to the substantive analysis when 
there is direct evidence. 
Perhaps most surprising, the Court also did not remand the case to analyze 
the unitary two-sided platform market but instead concluded that the conduct 
did not violate the Sherman Act, thereby ending the case. Potential cases against 
the dominant digital platforms will need to contend with this precedent and the 
noninterventionist antitrust approach it supports. 
i i .  anticompetitive mergers 
The historical trusts amounted to mergers among competing firms. Mergers 
are governed mainly by section 7 of the Clayton Act, though the Sherman Act 
also may be applied. Current merger law has features that might be expected to 
make it effective in preventing anticompetitive consolidation. 
First, most significant mergers must be reported in advance, and trigger 
waiting periods and a “second request” process in which the parties are required 
to submit documents and data in response to a Civil Investigative Demand from 
the reviewing enforcement agency. This provides the agency with time and in-
formation to carry out a detailed competitive effects analysis. If the reviewing 
agency concludes that the merger raises significant competitive concerns, the 
merging parties will often accept a corrective settlement—generally a divestiture 
or behavioral remedy. 
Second, if the parties refuse the settlement, the agency can seek an injunction 
to stop the merger (unlike in Europe where the European Commission’s Com-
petition Directorate can stop a merger on its own, subject to appeal to the 
courts).57 However, U.S. merger law is tilted somewhat in favor of the agencies. 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act condemns mergers that “may be substantially to 
lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly.”58 This language is not inter-
preted to require evidence that harm “is more likely than not.” Instead, the stand-
ard requires showing only a “reasonable probability” that competition will be 
reduced.59 
 
57. Merger Control Procedures, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Aug. 13, 2013), https://ec.europa.eu 
/competition/mergers/procedures_en.html, [https://perma.cc/BJ89-L6UY]. 
58. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018). 
59. United States v. AT&T Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1037 (D.C. Cir 2019) (quoting United States v. 
AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 190 n.16 (D.D.C. 2018)).  
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A. Horizontal Mergers 
For horizontal mergers, there is another agency advantage. The law has de-
veloped an anticompetitive presumption for mergers between competing firms 
with substantial market shares in concentrated markets.60 While the strength of 
this “structural presumption” has declined over time, it importantly contains a 
“sliding scale,” whereby stronger structural evidence increases the parties’ rebut-
tal burden.61 
The agencies nonetheless have permitted substantial consolidation. One 
possible explanation is that the agencies are resource constrained and risk averse 
to litigation, which leads them to approve problematic mergers or accept weak 
consent decrees rather than risk losing at trial. The stakes for the parties are 
huge, incentivizing large expenditures to defend their deals. By contrast, agency 
budgets have declined relative to the number, size, and complexity of mergers.62 
The very few matters that are not cleared or settled simultaneously with consent 
decrees typically involve markets with extremely high concentration, barriers to 
entry, and substantial potential concerns, and the agencies almost always prevail. 
Between 2012 and 2018, the merging parties either abandoned challenged mer-
gers, subsequently settled before trial, or lost in court in more than thirty-five 
cases, whereas the parties prevailed in only three.63 Only one of those three liti-
gated cases involved a plain-vanilla horizontal merger.64 Two others were non-
horizontal mergers where the structural presumption does not apply—one was 
a vertical merger65 and the other was a potential entry merger.66 Another notable 
recent loss was a vertical-plus-horizontal acquisition by a two-sided platform 
decided in 2020.67 
 
60. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963). This presumption means that 
market-structure evidence is sufficient to satisfy the agency’s burden of production for its 
prima facie case and to shift the burden to the merging parties to rebut the presumption. If 
the parties can carry its rebuttal burden, then the burden shifts back to the agency to show 
consumer harm on balance. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). 
61. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
62. Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, The 2010 HMGs Ten Years Later: Where Do We Go 
From Here? 2 (July 14, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628548 
[https://perma.cc/7YV9-DMZR]. 
63. Id. 
64. FTC v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. 10-1873, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20354, at *2-4, *40 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 22, 2011). 
65. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 164,-65 (D.D.C. 2018). 
66. FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 966 (N.D. Ohio 2015). 
67. United States v. Sabre Corp., No. 19-1548-LPS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64637 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 
2020). 
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The role of empirical evidence quantifying anticompetitive harms has also 
increased, and the agency’s litigation advantage has declined as a result. Econo-
metric studies and other data analyses can be challenging for judges, who are 
time and resource constrained. If the agency presents its empirical evidence in 
its case in chief, it may tend to be treated as part of the prima facie case rather 
than being seen as countering the parties’ empirical evidence in rebuttal, so that 
the agency may be seen as having the burden, notwithstanding the structural 
presumption. This is important because data sets are invariably imperfect, and 
it is always possible to poke little holes in even highly rigorous econometric stud-
ies. Econometric evidence can be probative, so it is important for courts to spend 
the necessary time to properly evaluate the evidence and not permit nitpicks to 
obtain disproportionate importance. Courts also should be cognizant that stand-
ard tests of statistical significance are focused on avoiding false positives, not 
false negatives.68 In this regard, courts might consider retention of court-ap-
pointed independent experts or advisors. 
Another possible reason for weak enforcement is a belief by agency leader-
ship that a market with at least four major competitors is normally enough to 
ensure sufficient competition.69 This belief, which goes back to the writings of 
Robert Bork,70 stems from a presumption that cartels and tacit coordination are 
unstable, particularly if there are more than a few firms. It also relies on a pre-
sumption that most mergers lead to procompetitive efficiencies. However, these 
views are unsupportable in light of the evidence that there have been many du-
rable cartels with significant numbers of firms, and numerous merger retrospec-
tive studies have shown price increases from mergers that have been cleared, 
sometimes despite consent decrees intended to remedy concerns.71 
B. Vertical Mergers and Acquisitions of Potential Competitors 
Acquisitions of vertically related firms and potential (including nascent) 
competitors may have helped dominant digital platforms to maintain their 
 
68. For further details, see Phillip Johnson, Edward Leamer & Jeffrey Leitzinger, Statistical Signif-
icance and Statistical Error in Antitrust Analysis, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 641 (2017); and Salop & 
Morton, supra note 62, at 14. 
69. For example, a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) review of merger challenges between 1993 
and 2016 found that only about 20% of the investigations of 5-to-4 mergers were challenged, 
whereas almost 60% of 4-to-3 and more than 80% of 3-to-2 mergers were challenged. For the 
detailed FTC challenge data, see Malcolm B. Coate, The Merger Review Process at the Federal 
Trade Commission from 1989 to 2016, at 36 tbl.5 (Feb. 28, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2955987 [https://perma.cc/8PAH-3935]. 
70. BORK, supra note 25, at 263-79. 
71. See, e.g., JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES 84-100 (2015). 
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power. Possible entrenching acquisitions include Facebook’s acquisitions of In-
stagram, WhatsApp, and now Giphy; Google’s acquisitions of YouTube, AdMob 
and Waze; and Amazon’s acquisitions of Quidsi (the parent of Diapers.com), 
Zappos, Wholefoods and Kiva (robotics).72 
These cases are harder for the agencies to win. Current legal doctrine does 
not recognize any structural or other anticompetitive presumptions applied to 
vertical mergers or potential competition acquisitions. In fact, the agencies lost 
the only potential competition case litigated in some time and the two cases in-
volving vertical merger issues.73 We turn now to a discussion of these three cases. 
1. FTC v. Steris 
There have been few potential-competition mergers litigated in the last 
thirty years. One reason is the high burden placed on merger challengers to show 
that the acquired firm is a likely entrant. For example, in its 1984 B.A.T. decision, 
the FTC required “clear proof” that the entry would have occurred.74 In 2015, the 
FTC failed in its case to block Steris’s acquisition of Synergy. Steris is the leading 
U.S. competitor in contract medical sterilization, and the FTC alleged that Syn-
ergy was a likely potential entrant into the concentrated U.S. market.75 The court 
rejected the claim, holding that the FTC did not show that Synergy “probably” 
would have entered the market absent the merger.76 
If the agency passes this first hurdle, it also must show that the independent 
entry likely would have significant procompetitive effects, relative to the acqui-
sition. There is no anticompetitive presumption for potential competition mer-
gers. This second hurdle could be significant if the agencies attack similar pro-
posed or consummated acquisitions by digital platforms. The acquired firm may  
 
 
72. For a comprehensive list of potentially entrenching acquisitions see COMPETITION IN DIGITAL 
MARKETS REPORT, supra note 7, at 406-50. 
73. The previous vertical merger taken to court by the government was in the late 1970s. Fruehauf 
Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). 
74. In re B.A.T. Indus., 104 F.T.C. 852, 926 (1984). 
75. FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 963-64 (N.D. Ohio 2015). According to the FTC, it 
was only necessary to show that the potential competitor “probably would have entered” the 
market absent the merger. Id. at 966. 
76. Id. 
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not have grown if it entered independently. For example, at the time of Face-
book’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012, Instagram was a very successful startup 
but with only thirteen employees and around thirty million users.77 
If the FTC attacks this consummated merger, the following issues would 
arise. The FTC likely will produce documents and testimony that Facebook saw 
Instagram as a major threat to its market power, and that fear motivated the bil-
lion-dollar acquisition.78 By contrast, Facebook likely will argue that Instagram’s 
standalone prospects were low, and it was Facebook’s investment and expertise 
that made Instagram highly successful. Like others, I would be interested to see 
the evidence on both sides of this case and the others discussed in this Essay. 
My policy concern is that the courts may be overly concerned with false pos-
itives and hold the agencies to an overly high burden that will allow dominant 
platforms to entrench their monopoly power by systematically purchasing the 
most threatening potential and nascent entrants. For example, suppose that Fa-
cebook’s acquisition did grow Instagram somewhat faster and added some use-
ful features. These product benefits likely would be swamped by the competitive 
benefits of Facebook facing a powerful new competitor, benefits which might 
have included placing more pressure on Facebook to innovate faster and better. 
As Judge Learned Hand suggested in Alcoa, “Many people believe that immunity 
from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress.”79 
2. United States v. AT&T80 
In 2017, the Department of Justice sued to block the acquisition of Time 
Warner by AT&T. This was a vertical merger; Time Warner provided video con-
tent to AT&T’s DirecTV and video distribution competitors like Dish, Comcast, 
Charter and Verizon.81 Because the merging firms are not direct competitors, 
 
77. Kurt Wagner, Here’s Why Facebook’s $1 Billion Instagram Acquisition Was Such a Great Deal, VOX 
(Apr. 9, 2017, 3:16 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2017/4/9/15235940/facebook-instagram 
-acquisition-anniversary [https://perma.cc/3RHE-KSDU]. 
78. For a contemporaneous list of possible reasons for the merger, see Kashmir Hill, 10 Reasons 
Why Facebook Bought Instagram, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2012, 5:00 PM EDT), https://www.forbes 
.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/04/11/ten-reasons-why-facebook-bought-instagram [https:// 
perma.cc/L735-HUEN]. 
79. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). 
80. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018). 
81. United States v. AT&T Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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vertical mergers do not directly increase concentration and the structural pre-
sumption does not apply. Nor have courts devised alternative anticompetitive 
presumptions.82 
The most common competitive concern in vertical mergers is “foreclosure” 
of the input sold by the merging firm, which can raise the costs or otherwise 
disadvantage rivals and thereby increase or preserve the market power of the 
merging firm.83 In modern parlance, foreclosure is gauged by the effect on the 
rivals’ ability to compete, not simply by the fraction of customers or input sup-
plies tied up by the defendant’s exclusive contracts or ownership.84 The DOJ’s 
expert economist testified that the foreclosure effect was Time Warner’s ability 
to gain additional bargaining leverage over DirecTV’s competitors, which in turn 
would give Time Warner the ability to negotiate higher license fees by threaten-
ing not to renew the licenses. The higher fees would lead to consumer harm in 
the form of higher monthly subscription fees charged by DirecTV and its distri-
bution market competitors. The court disagreed, relying on testimony by the 
parties’ executives and criticism of the model and empirical evidence presented 
by the DOJ’s expert. 
In retrospect, the DOJ may have erred in choosing to litigate. DOJ previously 
had accepted a consent decree in the parallel vertical merger between Comcast 
and NBCU, but rejected a similar voluntary consent decree offered by AT&T. 
Worse for the DOJ, the judge assigned to hear the case was the same judge who 
oversaw the Tunney Act judicial review of the Comcast/NBCU consent decree, 
a matter in which DOJ claimed that the consent decree would be effective.85 
 
82. For several proposed presumptions, see Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop & 
Fiona Scott Morton, Five Principles for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, 33 ANTITRUST 12 
(2019). For a new proxy measure of the increase in concentration, see Serge Moresi & Steven 
C. Salop, Quantifying the Increase in “Effective Concentration” from Vertical Mergers that Raise 
Input Foreclosure Concerns: Comment on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, 1-2 (Feb. 24, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543774 [https://perma.cc/K5MZ 
-AD3X]. 
83. Vertical Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMMISSION 4 (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-trade 
-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4HX4-F25G]; Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE 
L.J. 1962, 1975 (2018). 
84. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to 
Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 214 (1986). 
85. See United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D.D.C. 2011). The Department of 
Justice’s failure to distinguish AT&T/Time Warner from Comcast/NBCU is not totally illog-
ical in that the competitive issues and the voluntary consent agreement were somewhat dif-
ferent. See Gene Kimmelman & Steven Salop, AT&T’s Flawed Arbitration Proposal, MEDIUM 
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://medium.com/@PublicKnowledge/at-ts-flawed-arbitration-proposal 
-d020e66b2985 [https://perma.cc/6LRZ-DAZH] (distinguishing AT&T/TimeWarner and 
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The DOJ also accepted a greater litigation burden than necessary. It deviated 
from the standard three-step burden-shifting framework established in the 
Baker Hughes merger case.86 As applied to a vertical merger, it would have been 
sufficient in the first step for the DOJ to produce evidence of likely competitive 
harm, under the assumption that there are no efficiency benefits. The burden 
then would have shifted to the merging parties to rebut this evidence or to pro-
duce sufficient evidence that there would be procompetitive efficiency benefits. 
Only if the parties were able meet this burden would the burden have shifted 
back to the agency to show that there was a reasonable probability that the mer-
ger would be harmful overall. 
However, the DOJ did not follow this approach.87 Rather than simply rely-
ing on the fundamental economic drivers of increased bargaining leverage in the 
first step (the prima facie case), they also chose to introduce substantial quanti-
tative evidence of “upward pricing pressure” from the leverage as the centerpiece 
of their case.88 The DOJ also conceded that the merger would lead to an “elimina-
tion of double marginalization” (EDM) efficiency benefit that would create 
“downward pricing pressure” on DirecTV to reduce the prices it charged sub-
scribers after the merger. This is because DirecTV would obtain Time Warner 
content for free after the merger.89 
 
Comcast/NBCU because there were no noncompeting distributors in AT&T/TimeWarner 
matter).  
86. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
87. Steven C. Salop, The AT&T/Time Warner Merger: How Judge Leon Garbled Professor Nash, 6 J. 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 459, 460-61 (2018). 
88. The qualitative prediction that a vertical merger would tend to lead to additional bargaining 
leverage was conceded by AT&T’s economist but attacked by AT&T’s executives whose testi-
mony persuaded the judge. See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 218-19 
(D.D.C. 2018). 
89. The term “elimination of double marginalization” (EDM) comes from the fact that absent the 
merger, the input price charged by the upstream firm reflects a mark-up of its marginal costs, 
and the output price of the downstream firm reflects a second mark-up of those costs. By 
integrating the upstream and downstream firms, a vertical merger can eliminate one of the 
mark-ups, which can lead the downstream firm to reduce its output price. However, EDM 
merger benefits to consumers may be limited or reversed for a number of reasons, including 
fear that the lower output price would cause the upstream firm to sacrifice substantial profit-
able sales to other downstream firms, or fear that it might disrupt coordination among the 
downstream or upstream firms. In addition, if the merger is not permitted, EDM also might 
be achieved by contract, rather than being dependent on the merger. Compare Vertical Merger 
Guidelines, supra note 83, at 11-12 (noting that vertical mergers “often” eliminate double mar-
ginalization; when evaluating a vertical merger, the Agencies will weigh any “merger-specific” 
and “verifiable” elimination of double marginalization efficiencies against potential anticom-
petitive harms), with Salop, supra note 83, at 10-11 (noting that while vertical mergers may 
entail efficiency benefits, “the EDM theory does not prove that vertical mergers are almost 
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Thus, the DOJ essentially embraced from the outset the added burden to 
show in their affirmative case that consumers would be harmed on balance. The 
DOJ did not attempt to place the burden of showing these procompetitive effi-
ciencies on the merging parties. Had they done so, the parties would have to ex-
plain why they could not have achieved EDM by contract absent the merger.90 
After all, if the efficiencies were not “merger-specific” but could be achieved ab-
sent the merger, then there would be no policy rationale for consumers to bear 
the risk of higher prices from the merger.91 
If the DOJ instead took the approach of presenting a simpler prima facie case 
that focused on qualitative and less complex quantitative evidence to shift the 
burden to the parties, their chances would have been higher. The parties may 
have had a hard time presenting credible testimony for why they failed to solve 
the efficient contracting problem before the merger, yet would pass-on the EDM 
as lower prices to subscribers after the merger. For example, if premerger EDM 
would have reduced the likelihood of anticompetitive coordination, then they 
would not have an incentive to pass-on the savings after the merger. However, a 
DOJ victory certainly would not have been assured. The trial judge was very 
skeptical (overly skeptical in my view) of the credibility of the testimony of Time 
Warner’s cable TV customers, who also were competitors of DirecTV, and overly 
accepting of the credibility of the testimony of the AT&T and Time Warner ex-
ecutives.92 
3. United States v. Sabre Corp.93 
This most recent agency loss involved an acquisition by a dominant digital 
platform. Sabre is a digital platform that permits airlines to post schedules, fares 
and seat availability and allows travel agents to access this information, make 
 
always procompetitive. Claims that EDM must lead to lower downstream prices are over-
stated . . . the existence of EDM does not prove that the merger is procompetitive”), and Baker 
et. al., supra note 82, at 15 (“A careful analysis, rather than a presumption, also should be ap-
plied to efficiency claims involving the elimination of double marginalization.”). 
90. Such a contract could have involved a lump sum payment or large volume discount instead of 
a constant unit price per subscriber, or a take-or-pay provision that would have given DirecTV 
the same incentives as it would have if it obtained the Time Warner content for free. 
91. The agencies’ newly promulgated Vertical Merger Guidelines nominally require the parties to 
substantiate merger-specific EDM. However, as an indication of the agencies’ antienforce-
ment bias for vertical mergers, the Guidelines suggest a very low burden on the parties. Ver-
tical Merger Guidelines, supra note 83, at 11-12. 
92. See Salop, supra note 87, at 461; Salop & Scott Morton, supra note 62 at 19. 
93. United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97 (D. Del. 2020), vacated, No. 20-1767, 2020 
WL 4915824 (3d Cir. July 20, 2020). The trial court’s decision was vacated as moot following 
Sabre’s termination of its acquisition. 
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travel bookings and pay for them. Sabre proposed to acquire Farelogix, which 
provides technology to airlines. This technology allows an airline to disinterme-
diate Sabre by allowing the airline to connect directly to travel agencies and pro-
vide travel agencies with information and ticket-booking services itself. Thus, 
this acquisition was analytically like a vertical merger, where Farelogix sells a 
critical input (i.e., its technology) to airlines, which they use to compete with 
Sabre for the business of travel agents. The competitive concern is that Sabre 
would foreclose airlines’ ability to acquire the Farelogix technology input. 
Perhaps attempting to exploit the horizontal-merger structural presumption 
and avoid the difficulties they faced in AT&T/Time Warner, the DOJ did not 
litigate the case as a vertical merger. Instead, the complaint alleged that Sabre 
and Farelogix competed in the provision of booking services for airline tickets 
sold through travel agencies. This competition is indirect, resulting from Fare-
logix working with the individual airlines to disintermediate Sabre. However, 
the trial court did not miss the point. It observed that “Sabre and Farelogix view 
each other as competitors” and found that “the record reflects competition be-
tween Sabre’s and Farelogix’s direct connection solutions for airlines.”94 
Having concluded that competition was reduced by the merger, the trial 
court nonetheless rejected the DOJ’s complaint on the grounds that Farelogix 
and Sabre do not compete in the two-sided platform market.95 While Sabre pro-
vides services to customers on both sides (i.e., to both airlines and travel agen-
cies), Farelogix provides services to only one side (i.e., to airlines, but not to 
travel agencies). The travel agency services are provided by the airlines them-
selves, using the Farelogix technology. 
This approach was both defective and unnecessary because Sabre competed 
with the combination of Farelogix and the airlines.96 Yet the court thought that 
American Express compelled the opposite result, despite its own fact-finding and 
the vertical nature of the transaction. If other U.S. courts similarly follow this 
same defective approach, the result will be underdeterrence of anticompetitive 
acquisitions by digital platforms.97 Indeed, this approach would lead to ludi-
 
94. Sabre Corp., 2020 WL 1855433, at *14-15. 
95. Id. at *32. 
96. See, e.g., Randy M. Stutz, We’ve Seen Enough: It Is Time to Abandon Amex and Start Over on 
Two-Sided Markets, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 1 (2020), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2020/04/Amex-Commentary-4.21.20-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU44 
-FMC3]. 
97. The United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority  found the merger to be anticom-
petitive on the basis of its market study, and the transaction has been abandoned. Competition 
& Mkts. Auth., CMA Blocks Airline Booking Merger, GOV.UK (Apr. 9, 2010), https://www 
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crous results. Under this reasoning, Microsoft could have legally ended the com-
petitive threat from Netscape and Java simply by acquiring them instead of try-
ing to destroy them. 
i i i .  strengthening antitrust 
This Essay has indicated some difficulties that antitrust enforcers will face 
under current law if they conclude that a more aggressive approach is needed to 
rein in dominant digital platforms. Antitrust is a common-law process, so doc-
trine in principle could accommodate this new set of circumstances.    
First, merger law could evolve by adopting a presumption that all acquisi-
tions by dominant digital platforms protected by network effects are presump-
tively anticompetitive.98 More interventionist merger guidelines governing ver-
tical mergers and potential entry mergers could influence courts in this direction. 
However, while the recently promulgated Vertical Merger Guidelines had an op-
portunity to do so, the agencies instead adopted a nonenforcement bias. This 
approach was criticized by the two dissenting FTC Commissioners as well as my 
coauthors and me.99 
Second, exclusionary conduct by dominant firms could be subjected to a slid-
ing scale with a reduced burden of proof on the plaintiff and a more skeptical 
view of their efficiency claims. These doctrinal changes could lead to more anti-
trust enforcement and greater deterrence of exclusionary conduct by dominant 
digital platforms. This change would be justified by the recognition that such 
agreements and conduct by dominant networks involve greater harms from false 
negatives than false positives.100 Greater emphasis on preventing false negatives 
is particularly appropriate in that antitrust condones monopoly pricing not 
found to arise from anticompetitive conduct.101 Thus, it is more important to 




98. Baker et. al., supra note 82, at 17. Scott Hemphill has suggested that such mergers alternatively 
might violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. C. Scott Hemphill, Disruptive Incumbents: Platform 
Competition in an Age of Machine Learning, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1984-88 (2019). 
99. FED. TRADE COMM’N, NO. P810034, DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER REBECCA 
KELLY SLAUGHTER (2020); FED. TRADE COMM’N, NO. P810034, DISSENTING STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER ROHIT CHOPRA (2020); Baker et al., supra note 82. 
100. See Gavil & Salop, supra note 26. 
101. Antitrust courts eschew such price regulation as reaching beyond their expertise and as re-
quiring ongoing monitoring of the monopolist. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Of-
fices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). 
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bring private cases are disadvantaged in litigation by the asymmetry in the fi-
nancial stakes. 
Third, another possibility to improve merger enforcement could be legisla-
tion that increases agency budgets and mandates both a lower burden on the 
plaintiff and a higher rebuttal burden on the defendant. For example, Senator 
Amy Klobuchar introduced a bill to amend section 7 of the Clayton Act to reduce 
the agencies’ evidentiary burden by changing the standard from “substantially” 
lessens competition to “materially” lessens competition, where “materially” is 
defined to mean “more than a de minimis amount” and requires the firms in re-
buttal to show that their deal would not materially harm competition.102  
Fourth, a similar strengthening also could be applied to section 2 of the Sher-
man Act as a complement to the sliding scale approach. Some commentators also 
have proposed regulation of exclusionary conduct by a new Digital Authority.103 
In light of the potential need to closely monitor the changing conduct of domi-
nant digital networks over time, regulation may be necessary to supplement an-
titrust. 
This proposed strengthening also harkens back to history. Shortcomings in 
the Sherman Act led to the creation of the FTC and the adoption of the Clayton 
Act and FTC Act in 1914. The Clayton Act was amended in 1936 with the Rob-
inson-Patman Act to better deter discriminatory prices that reduced competi-
tion. Congress further amended section 7 of the Clayton Act to close loopholes 
and strengthen merger enforcement in 1950. Finally, the Hart Scott Rodino 
(HSR) Act in 1976 improved merger enforcement by requiring premerger noti-
fication of large mergers and the “second request” process. Prior to the HSR Act, 
mergers could be consummated before the agencies had a chance to act, which 
caused enforcement delays. It also reduced the ability to obtain meaningful relief 
because it often was difficult to “unscramble the eggs” after the merging firms 
integrated their operations. 
However, economic deregulation and the loosening of antitrust standards 
that began in the late-1970s have weakened constraints on mergers and domi-
nant firms. The time has come today to move in the other direction. Because the 
common law can be slow to adjust, and in light of the conservative antitrust 
views of the Supreme Court majority, new legislation would be a faster and more 
certain route to reform. 
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102. Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2019, S. 307, 116th Cong. § 3. 
103. Stigler Comm. on Dig. Platforms, supra note 6, at 104-06. 
dominant digital platforms 
587 
sions with Jonathan Baker, Dale Collins, Carl Shapiro, and John Woodbury. I regu-
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